This paper delineates the position of American religious groups in modern party politics. We first outline two different models of religious politics, the ethnoreligious and the religious restructuring model. We then use a number of data sets to reconstruct the contribution that religious groups have made to party coalitions from the New Deal era to the present, considering both theoretical perspectives. We test the influence of religious factors against other influences on party identification, including region, social class and gender during the 1960s, the 1980s and the contemporary era. Finally, we explore the role that religious influences play in the contemporary ideological polarization between the Republican and Democratic parties.
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Throughout American history, political parties have depended upon religious groups to help build winning electoral coalitions. Parties and candidates can mobilize the citizenry in their churches, while pastors and denominational leaders can relay partisan cues to their flocks and voice the concerns of their members to party elites. Such activities tend to promote stable partisan ties for religious groups. Nevertheless, changes in the alignment of religious groups with political parties can and do occur. Indeed, party coalitions have changed dramatically since the end of World War II, and religious groups have played a significant role in those changes. It is no exaggeration to say that religion has been an engine of partisan realignment in the past generation.
The details of this realignment are complex. Religious groups have not only shifted their partisan attachments, but have altered these identifications at different times and for different reasons. In addition, cleavages have emerged within some religious traditions that mirror the partisan divisions so apparent in contemporary American politics. This chapter explores these transformations, demonstrating that the underlying nexus between religious groups and political parties has changed in a way that has contributed to today's partisan polarization.
Models of the Ties between Religious Groups and Political Parties
Although the earliest social scientific studies of the electorate focused on the socioeconomic differences between Republicans and Democrats, they also confirmed the continuing power of religious divisions (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954) . Catholics were more likely to identify as Democrats than were their Protestant counterparts, regardless of social class. Conversely, Protestants outside the South were more likely to choose the Republican label than Catholics were during the postwar period. Early research based on the American National Election Studies (Campbell et al. 1954 (Campbell et al. , 1960 reached similar conclusions. Even today, political scientists, pollsters and pundits talk about candidates' pursuit of religious groups, using the common parlances of "the Catholic vote," the "Jewish vote," or the "white Protestant vote."
In recent years, as religious groups have multiplied, the lexicon has extended to the "Muslim," "Mormon" or even "Hindu vote." All these references suggest the historic focus on religious affiliation as a marker in electoral politics.
Recently the analysis of religious voting has become even more complicated. With the rise of the Christian Right in the late 1970s and its increasing influence within the Republican Party, observers have implicitly defined religion not by affiliation, but by types of belief, often using terms such as "Evangelical," "fundamentalist," "conservative Christian," or "traditionalist
Catholic." At the other end of this "belief" dimension are the rising numbers of non-religious or secular voters. This dimension of religion is often captured rather crudely in the shorthand of "the God gap," measured empirically by the frequency of church attendance (Sullivan 2008, 4-7; Olson and Green 2006) . As a result, anyone perusing the burgeoning popular and scholarly literature on religion in American politics is likely to be confused by the vast array of religious classifications and measures used by analysts. Our basic assumption here is that the scheme which taps best all the important facets of American religion will provide the most insight into political behavior.
To construct such a classification requires consideration of two competing views about the critical components of American religion. The first of these, the ethnoreligious perspective, stresses categories based on religious belonging, especially membership in religious traditions, and the long-term political conflicts and alliances among those traditions. The second, the religious restructuring perspective, emphasizes emerging divisions within religious traditions, based on changes in religious belief and behavior, and the consequent formation of new political 3 coalitions across the boundaries of old traditions. Each perspective highlights different facets of religious faith and, thus, different operational measures, and each has virtues for political analysis (see Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009 ). We shall outline the basic contentions of each and then proceed to an empirical examination of religion's influence on party identification from 1940 to the present.
The Ethnoreligious Model
The earliest social scientific studies of religion and voting behavior relied implicitly on an ethnoreligious interpretation of the links between religion and American politics. As developed in more systematic fashion by the so-called ethnocultural historians in the 1960s and after, this theory identifies the key religious groups as the historic denominations and religious families born in Europe and later multiplying on America's shores. Presbyterians, Lutherans, Baptists, Episcopalians, Methodists, and a myriad other Protestants combined distinct religious worldviews with cultural attributes such as ethnicity, race or regional location. They were soon joined by other ethnoreligious traditions, including Catholics, Jews, and Eastern Orthodox. All these groups developed distinct political cultures, fostered by religious leaders, houses of worship, and tight-knit ethnoreligious neighborhoods. Although the assumptions underlying this analytic framework are often not articulated, ethnocultural historians usually argued that ethnoreligious groups held differing worldviews, cultural preferences, and negative reference groups that shaped their political alliances (McCormick 1974) .
Thus, for these historians religion influenced American politics primarily through affiliation or belonging, with partisan attachments and voting behavior reflecting "political expressions of shared values derived from the voter's membership in, and commitment to, ethnic and religious groups" (Kleppner 1970, 35) . Given the context of a two-party system, religious groups naturally sought compatible allies, as even the largest denominations needed assistance in influencing electoral politics. And as religious groups were often in conflict, party politics naturally involved competing ethnoreligious alliances (Kleppner 1970 (Kleppner , 1979 Jensen 1971; Formisano 1983; Swierenga 1990 Swierenga , 2009 ). In the nineteenth century, a Whig and later Republican coalition of "pietists" faced a Democratic alliance of "liturgicals," eventually joined by southern white Protestants after the Civil War and Reconstruction (Kleppner 1970 (Kleppner , 1979 Jensen 1971) .
By the early New Deal years, these coalitions had reorganized; important theological and organizational changes in the religious world had split white Protestant churches into "Evangelical" and "Mainline" traditions, but ethnoreligious loyalties remained at their base (Carpenter 1997; Marsden 1987) . Mainline Protestants provided much of the GOP's leadership, as well as its most faithful voters, whereas Catholics, Jews, and other religious minorities, such as southern Evangelicals, constituted the bedrock of the Democracy. As a result, early social science research in the 1940s found religious divisions still vital, even in the context of the supposed dominance of class-based New Deal politics (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954) .
The Restructuring Model
Despite the virtues of the ethnoreligious model for historical analysis, it has lost at least some of its explanatory power in contemporary politics. The underlying bases for ethnoreligious politics have largely vanished: the powerful social integration within religious traditions, the social isolation of those traditions, and the strong tensions among them (Kleppner 1979) . Where these conditions still obtain, the model may still be relevant, as in describing the political behavior of certain close-knit ethnoreligious communities such as black Protestants, Latino Catholics, Jews, and Latter-day Saints. Indeed, even affiliation with churches in the historic Evangelical, Mainline Protestant or Catholic traditions may still matter politically, in part because such membership is now truly elective, allowing believers to choose a congenial religious, and perhaps political, environment (Green and Guth 1993; Hout and Fischer 2002; Putnam and Campbell 2010) . Thus, many analysts still focus on ethnoreligious tradition, variously defined (Manza and Brooks 1999; Steensland, Park, Regnerus, Robinson, Wilcox, and Woodberry 2000; Layman 2001; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller 2002) .
Nevertheless, many sociologists of religion argue that the ethnoreligious description of religious life and its political implications has less and less utility. As ascriptive affiliations break down, ethnic and religious neighborhoods disappear, geographic mobility rises and intermarriage abounds, Americans move freely among religious settings, ignoring historical ties of denomination, ethnicity, region, and even family (Ammerman 1997; Pew Forum, 2008; Putnam and Campbell 2010) . For such theorists, it is now belief, not belonging, that serves as the fundamental basis for religious alignments in politics. As people re-sort themselves into congenial theological environments, American religion has been restructured into two camps with opposing worldviews, fostered by competing religious institutions and leaders. As Robert Wuthnow (1988) and James Davison Hunter (1991) have argued, old religious traditions have been polarized by theological, social, and cultural conflicts into a conservative, orthodox, or traditionalist faction on one side, and a liberal, progressive, or modernist bloc on the other. And the growing number of secular Americans may well represent a natural extension of the liberal or progressive side-perhaps as the product of restructuring battles (Hout and Fischer 2002) .
Wuthnow saw such developments splitting religious institutions, but Hunter's apocalyptic title, Culture Wars, projected the divisions into the polity as a threat to social stability. Hunter's assumption was that religious factionalism clearly led to political polarization.
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Although scholarly reaction to the "culture wars" thesis has tended to focus on these purported political manifestations (Williams 1997; Fiorina 2005; Nivoli and Brady 2006) , it is important to remember that Wuthnow and Hunter's original formulations were rooted in theological developments, especially the emergence of opposing worldviews. Their competing camps were characterized by alternative belief systems, different religious practices, and adherence to rival religious movements. Indeed, identification of these polarizing forces probably constitutes the most valuable insight of the restructuring perspective.
Although critics are rightly skeptical about extreme statements of the restructuring theory, anecdotal evidence for a milder version is convincing, especially in "old-line" American religious institutions. The religious press reports continual battles between traditionalists and modernists in almost every major Protestant body, as well as in the American Catholic church.
Conflicts over how best to interpret the Bible in the Southern Baptist Convention, the controversy over the installation of gay bishops in the Episcopal Church, and the continuing factionalism within the United Methodist Church are just three examples of divisions arising within Protestant churches in recent decades that seem to mirror Wuthnow and Hunter's descriptions.
Although rooted in theology and religious practice, these struggles also produce opposing moral, social, economic, and political perspectives. Most of the scholarly literature focuses on the political controversies over social issues, such as abortion and gay rights, but there is growing evidence that these theological divisions have come to influence public attitudes on foreign policy issues and economic policy attitudes as well (Guth et al. 2006; Guth 2009 ). It is true that some culture war theorists overstate the consequent polarization, both within religious institutions and the mass public: there are centrists in the religious wars, just as there are moderates in the political wars. However, the religious divisions they identify may well influence the structure of electoral politics, if only because both religious and political elites are polarized along these lines, thus shaping the cues presented to the public (Guth et al.1997; Fiorina 2005) .
A third "hybrid" theoretical formulation builds on the insights of the ethnoreligious and restructuring perspectives, arguing that both religious affiliation and religious beliefs help to explain how religion shapes American politics (Layman 1997 (Layman , 2001 Kohut, Green, Keeter, and Toth 2000; Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt, and Green 2006; Green 2007; Green, Kellstedt, Smidt, and Guth 2007; Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009) Given the varied impact of ethnoreligious forces and restructuring influences among American religious groups, we think such a hybrid model is appropriate, emphasizing the study of belonging, believing, and behaving, as well as their interactions, as the best means to understand religion's impact on American politics. We expect that both religious affiliation and traditionalism in belief and practice are factors that connect people to contemporary party politics, if in varying degrees (Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009; Layman and Green 2005) .
Religious Groups and Party Identification
Delineating the contours of partisan identification by religious groups over the past seventy years is by no means an easy task. The available data on religious affiliation have various limitations, especially during the early years of the analysis, and finding evidence on religious belief and behavior is even more arduous. Nevertheless, we have produced a timeseries for religious affiliation and partisanship that allows us to trace the transformations in partisan religious alignments with some degree of confidence.
1 And although we cannot test the restructuring thesis for the entire period, given the absence of data on religious belief in the earliest years, we have adequate measures for selected years in the 1960s and beyond.
First, we consider the contours of partisan identification by ethnoreligious groups over the past seventy years. ( Table 1 about In theoretical terms, Table 1 suggests that there is still some support for an ethnoreligious model linking religion to political behavior. Jews and Latino Catholics join black Protestants as strong supporters of the Democratic Party, suggesting that religion and ethnicity are critical to partisan attachments, as the ethnoreligious model would indicate, a conclusion buttressed by the Democratic bias of other faiths and, perhaps, the religiously unaffiliated. And the Evangelical religious tradition is now clearly tied to the GOP, more strongly than Mainline Protestants (the former "Republican party at prayer") had ever been, and at much the same magnitude as white Catholicism was for the New Deal Democracy.
In sum, religious traditions still differ in partisan attachments, as the ethnoreligious model suggests, but we also need to examine a religious restructuring model to see if it is a better fit in the twenty-first century. This is especially important in considering party identification among Mainline Protestants and white Catholics, the new "swing groups" in American religious politics; after all, most members of these communities are still partisans, not independents. And although they are not always explicit on this point, the restructuring theorists tend to see theological divisions most potent within the large, "older" American religious traditions such as Evangelical and Mainline Protestants as well as European-origin Catholics. These groups are increasingly acculturated or assimilated, well-educated, and engage in high rates of intermarriage, thus reducing ethnoreligious sources of conflict (Putnam and Campbell 2010) . On the other hand, the influences of higher education, critical approaches to religion, modern communications and globalization have all served to create the very theological divisions described by the restructuring theorists. If restructuring is occurring and has political implications, it should be most evident in the three largest American religious traditions.
( partisan ties has changed as well. Finally, the realignment has probably contributed in a variety of ways to greater partisan polarization in the society. Much of this is related to the shifting religious coalitions of our two major parties, to which we now turn.
Religion and Partisan Coalitions: The Ethnoreligious Perspective
What are the contributions of ethnoreligious groups to the coalitions of the two major parties? How has the importance of each group changed over time? Tables 3a and 3b 
Religion and Partisan Coalitions: The Restructuring Perspective
The substantial contributions that the large white religious traditions make to both parties prompt us to look at the partisan role that theological factionalism plays within those traditions.
The evidence is found in Tables 4a and 4b ( Tables 4a and 4b about here) Turning to the Democratic coalition, we recall from Table 3b that the three white traditions accounted for 77 percent of Democratic identifiers in the 1960s-about the same as their contribution to the GOP in 2008-but that proportion had declined to less than 50 percent in 2008. That "loss" was not shared equally among all theological factions, however. As Table 4b demonstrates, the decline in Democratic coalition contributions among Evangelicals, Mainliners and white Catholics was most significant among theological traditionalists and, to a lesser extent, identification, but we can shed some light on the question. In Table 5 , we compare the impact of both kinds of variables in explaining party identification in three periods: the late 1960s, the 1980s, and 2008. These eras were chosen because we have comparable measures of religion and other variables needed for the analysis. Although the measures in the three regressions in Table 5 are not always exactly the same, we have made them as comparable as possible, even where this resulted in some loss of information. The contours of the New Deal party system are clearly seen in the impact of the socioeconomic and demographic variables. Higher education and income were significant contributors to Republican identification, while older citizens also tended to be more Republican.
The historic regional bases for the party system were also still in evidence in the 1960s, as residents of the Northeast were somewhat more Republican and southerners still adhered to the old "solid Democratic South." Married respondents were slightly more Democratic, but no gender gap was in evidence. All in all, the results show that both ethnoreligious factors and socioeconomic variables made substantial contributions to party identification. Table 5 .
The Ideological Sources of Religious Differences and Partisan Polarization
We have demonstrated that ethnoreligious tradition and religious restructuring are reflected in the composition of American "parties in the electorate," but what are the fundamental sources of these differences? Much of the literature on polarization focuses on ideological divisions (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006) , with scholars variously emphasizing differences on social, economic or even foreign policy attitudes. 9 Those who see emerging religious divisions tend to focus on social issues, such as abortion, gay rights or stem-cell research, but there is evidence that religious groups have distinctive positions on other issues that may also contribute to the characteristic party alignments we have shown.
As a first cut at such ideological differences among religious groups, we draw on the 2008 National Survey of Religion and Politics, with its large battery of religious and issue items.
To simplify presentation, we have calculated three factor scores for respondents' positions on social, economic welfare and foreign policy issues, respectively. Social conservatism is calculated from four items on abortion, gay rights, same-sex marriage and federal support for embryonic stem cell research. Foreign policy militancy is drawn from eight items on support for the Iraq war (two), priority of the war on terrorism, backing for pre-emptive U.S. military action, preference for Israel over the Arabs in the Middle East, favoring a strong military, and two questions claiming a special role for the United States in international politics (for more documentation and discussion, see Guth 2010) . Finally, welfare conservatism is derived from six items on the benefits of large tax cuts, the need for higher taxes to fund programs to aid the poor, the preference for more government services, the need for greater government assistance for minorities, support for an expanded national health care system, and approval of expanded environmental protection. 10 Table 6 reports the mean factor scores for each religious category,
showing the degree of issue divergence among groups, with negative factor scores representing 9 For an alternative perspective stressing the social identity of voters, see Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002 . Ironically, although these authors see party identification as analogous to religious affiliation, they do not treat religious affiliation as one of the formative social identities influencing partisanship. 10 The theta reliability coefficients for the social, foreign policy militancy and welfare policy scores are .70, .75 and .70, respectively.
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"conservative" positions and positive scores, "liberal" ones (the mean for all the factor scores, of course, is zero, representing the center of the issue dimension).
( Table 6 about here) A look at religious group scores on social issues certainly supports some common observations about the way that abortion and gay rights divide the public. As an ethnoreligious community, Evangelicals clearly define the conservative end of this spectrum, although Latterday Saints and Latino Protestants come close. Black Protestants and Latino Catholics are also slightly to the traditionalist side, while white Catholics are barely on the "socially liberal" side and Mainline Protestants are a little further in that direction. On the other hand, the other faiths category, the unaffiliated, and Jews occupy the liberal end of the social issue continuum. Within the three major white ethnoreligious traditions, moreover, there are striking differences between religious traditionalists and religious modernists, with Evangelical traditionalists the most conservative and Mainline modernists, the most liberal. And among the unaffiliated, the truly secular and the agnostic/atheist groups match Jews in social liberalism. In any event, scholars arguing for a "culture war" interpretation of American politics can certainly find some evidence here in the striking divergence of important religious groups on these issues.
A glance at the next column on foreign policy militancy suggests that such differences are not confined to social issues. Once again, Evangelicals are the most conservative, followed by Latter-day Saints. On this policy dimension, Mainliners and white Catholics are slightly to the "militant" side, as are American Jews. 11 All the remaining ethnocultural groups and unaffiliated respondents constitute the "liberal" or "antimilitarist" contingent on these issues. When we consider the effects of restructuring, we see that Evangelical traditionalists hold down the most militant end of the continuum, followed by Mainline traditionalists, and then Catholic traditionalists and centrists. Although the pattern here differs slightly from that for social issues, as black Protestants and the Latino groups shift to the "liberal" side, clearly the overall alignment is quite similar.
On welfare issues the religious divisions are less stark, but follow the same general To summarize overall ideological divisions, we have used two procedures. First, we ran a secondary factor analysis of the three issue dimensions to produce an overall measure of issue ideology. As a second check, we used the z-scores for self-identified ideology to provide a comparable measure. Reassuringly, both produce very similar patterns among the religious 12 Although we cannot consider the issue here, evidence from the National Survey of Religion and Politics from 1992 to the present suggests that the religious divisions have "extended" from social to foreign policy to economic issues over time. The mechanism for this evolution is not clear but may involve various processes of religious and secular elite influence and partisan socialization. 
Conclusions
Religion has served as one of the key social bases of partisan attachments throughout American history. Yet the nature of the ties between religious groups and the major parties has What is less obvious is the exact role that religious affiliation and religious beliefs and behaviors have played in these processes of transformation. We have argued that religious belonging has been the driving force in partisan attachments for most religious groups throughout American history. For black Protestants, Latino Protestants and Catholics, Jews, Latter-day Saints, and other smaller religious groups (Muslims, Buddhists, and Unitarians, to name only a few), affiliation with the group is associated with partisan ties. This model of party attachments-the ethnoreligious model-was the basis of partisanship in the nineteenth century (Kleppner 1979) and remains so today for these groups. However, for the three largest white religious traditions-Evangelical and Mainline Protestantism and Anglo-Catholicism-the basis for party ties has changed in the past generation.
Differences of religious belief and behavior within these traditions, produced by religious restructuring, have become central to partisan attachments. Traditionalists have moved most dramatically in a Republican direction, while their modernist counterparts have often gravitated in the other direction. These developments have been most evident among Evangelicals, somewhat weaker among Mainliners, and still developing among white Catholics. All in all, the best explanatory fit for current trends is a hybrid model, given the importance of both ethnoreligious tradition, especially for smaller "outgroups," and theological traditionalism, which has increasingly come to shape the partisan choices of the major white traditions.
Most, but not all, of these religious influences on partisanship appear to be mediated by Cell scores are determined in the same manner as in Table 1 . Sources are identical to those in Table 1 . 
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